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Abstract
In this paper we combine Acemoglu’s model of the economic origins of democracy with
Lohmann’s model of political mass protest. This alllows us to provide an analysis of the
economic causes of political regime change based on the microfoundations of rebellion. We
are able to derive conditons under which democracy arises peacefully, when it occurs only
after a violent rebellion, and when oligarchy persists. We model these posibilities in a world
of asymmetric information where information cascades are possible, and where these cascades
may involve errors in a paratian sense.
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1 Introduction
Why are some countries democratic and others not? Why do some countries have stable political
institutions and others seem to be in a constant state of flux? And, what role does economics
play in determining a country’s political institutions and their stability? Obviously these are large,
diﬃcult, and important questions. They are also questions on which until comparatively recently
economic theory was relatively mute. The existent literature, like this paper, is concerned primarily
with the questions of if and how societies will evolve from Oligarchy to Democracy. Two main
themes pervade this literature; the first as in Acemoglu et al (1), (2), (3), (4), Conley and Temini
(7), Ellis and Fender (8), (9) and Overland et al (15) examines political and economic decisions
when a ruling elite face a threat of revolution. Franchise extensions then arise as a means of
removing this threat. A second strand of literature, Lizzeri and Persico (10), Llavador and Oxoby
(11), involves an elite extending the franchise so as to avoid pareto inferior redistributive policies
arising from internal political competition. In these setups franchise extension does not require an
external threat of revolution. A common element in both strands of literature is that the extension
of the franchise is always peaceful, the threat of rebellion or the existence of superior economic
policies under democracy are suﬃcient to bring it into eﬀect. Clearly there are examples of such
peaceful democratic transitions such as Britain in the 19th century, however there are numerous
other examples where changes in the franchise only arose after bloody conflict, the French Revolution
springs to mind. Indeed why did rational forward looking French aristocrats not foresee the shadow
of Madame Guillotine and behave accordingly? In this paper we shall argue that they did, but we
shall also contend that in world of asymmetric information there are perfect Bayesian equilibria in
which an elite will rationally choose to run the risk of rebellion.
Our approach is to resite the analysis of Acemoglu et al in such an asymmetric information world.
In our analysis a rich enfranchised elite observe the state of nature, while the unenfranchised poor
only receive a signal imperfectly correlated with this state. The poor may however learn from
the actions of the rich and each other. This is precisely the informational environment in which
information cascades of the type developed by Banerjee (5), and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and
Welch (6) arise. Following Lohmann (12), (13), (14) we use these information cascades to provide
a microfoundation for mass political protest and rebellion. Combining this theory of rebellion with
the structure developed by Acemoglu allows us to explore the economic origins of political regimes,
particularly we can explore how the quality of information available in a society eﬀects the regime
choices of a ruling elite. We show, for example, that revolution against an oligarchy is more likely
the higher is the quality of information available to the poor, that is open societies tend to become
democratic either peacefully or via a rebellion.
2 A Simple Two-Period Model
Rather than launch into the complexities of a fully fledged model we begin with a simple two period
version, this both helps to lay out our arguments and to fix notation.
2.1 Economics
We assume a static population of n individuals m of whom are homogeneous poor agents, and n−m
are homogeneous rich agents. The poor are more numerous than the rich, m > n−m. Each period
the agents receive constant endowment incomes yr,and yp where subscripts indicate rich and poor
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respectively; naturally yr > yp. In addition to endowment incomes the agents may also receive or
pay transfers, Ti i = r, p, from or to the government. For simplicity we assume these transfers can
only take place between the rich and poor, and may take one of two values in per-poor-agent terms,
Tp ∈ {0, T}, so assuming the government must balance its per-period budget the transfer per rich
agent must be Tr ∈ {0,−
³
m
n−m
´
T}. Both groups of agents discount the future at the common
rate δ, so the two period indirect utility of an individual agent is written
V (yi | Ti(t)) = (1 + δ) yi +
X
t=1,2
δt−1Ti(t) i = r, p (1)
2.2 Politics
We assume that at the beginning of the first period only the rich are enfranchised, the median voter
is a rich agent who thus chooses transfers. At the end of period 1 the poor have the option of
staging a rebellion or not. If a rebellion takes place it is successful, the rich are ejected from the
country and the poor seize their endowment income from both the first and second periods. A
rebellion is destructive and a portion µ of total endowment income is destroyed in both periods.
The magnitude of µ is stochastic, taking values of µh and µl with probabilities ρ(µj ) j = h, l
respectively. The notation h and l denotes high and low threat states, representing states in which
there is either little or a great deal of destruction respectively, hence µl > µh . The poor do not
have the option of rebelling in the second period. Faced with an incipient rebellion the rich have
two options, to make transfers, or to extend the franchise to all poor agents. In the latter case
where the franchise is extended the median voter becomes a poor agent who then sets transfers for
both periods.
2.3 Model Sequence
The sequence of events is as follows. At the beginning of period 1 nature selects µ, the rich then
decide whether to extended the franchise, if they do the poor then set transfers for period 1, if they
do not the rich set transfers for period 1. At the end of the first period the poor if not enfranchised
decide whether or not to rebel. If they do they are successful, the rich are expelled and their
endowments seized by the poor. If the franchise is not extended and there is no rebellion then the
rich again set transfers in the second period. If the franchise has been extended then the poor set
transfers in the second period.
2.4 Informational Assumptions and Equilibria
To the simple structure outlined above we add two further assumptions
1. The following sets of inequalities describe the structure of payoﬀs
(1 + δ)
¡
yp + T
¢
> (1 + δ)
µ
yp +
µ
n−m
m
¶
yr
¶
(1− µh ) > (1 + δ) yp + T
> (1 + δ)
µ
yp +
µ
n−m
m
¶
yr
¶
(1− µl ) > (1 + δ) yp (2)
(1 + δ) yr > (1 + δ) yr −
µ
m
n−m
¶
T > (1 + δ)
∙
yr −
µ
m
n−m
¶
T
¸
> 0 (3)
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2. µ is observed by both the rich and poor at the beginning of the first period.
It is now straightforward to characterize the equilibria in this model.
Proposition 1 (1) If µ = µl the rich do not extend the franchise, there is no revolution, transfers
are Tp = T in the first period and Tp = 0 in the second. (2) If alternatively µ = µh the rich extend
the franchise, there is no revolution, transfers are Tp = T in both periods.
The proofs of this and all subsequent propositions and lemmas are provided in the appendix.
Proposition 1 is the result previously obtained by Acemoglu et. al. that the rich instigate
democracy to make future redistributional promises credible, promises they require to prevent
revolution. It is useful to reflect on the implications of this result and why it arises. Notice
first that democracy arises because of the oﬀ-equilibrium threat of rebellion, the transition to
democracy is in this sense peaceful. Notice also that if µ = µh democracy must occur, whereas if
µ = µl oligarchy persists. In this sense democracy occurs when it "aught" to and never when it
"shouldn’t", democracy or the lack thereof is never a mistake. The logic behind these results is
straightforward, both the rich and the poor know that the poor will successfully rebel whenever it
is in their interests to do, that is if the expected value of rebellion exceeds the expected value of
oligarchy with transfers, so, once µ = µh is known rebellion will occur unless the rich can find a
way of credibly promising future transfers. Democracy is inevitable. However, suppose we retain
the payoﬀ structure of our example but change the informational assumptions, that is
20. µ is observed by the rich but not the poor at the beginning of the first period.
This immediately changes things considerably, unable to observe µ the poor do not know if they
should rebel or not. The rich observe µ but this no longer tells them how the poor will behave.
Suppose that the poor receive some imperfect information about the true state, and suppose also
they know the equilibrium strategy of the rich, and can thus make any appropriate inferences about
the state from observing their behavior (we are deliberately vague here but will make our argument
precise later). The rich still face a credibility problem in the second period, so unless they introduce
democracy their second period equilibrium strategy must involve Tp = 0, however in period 1 their
strategy may now be contingent on the state observed and the inferences they know the poor will
subsequently make. Let T ip ∈ {0, T} be the strategy of the rich if the state is i ∈ {h, l} further let
the probability that a revolution will occur given the state and the strategy of the rich be written
β(i, T ip, T
−i
p ) for i ∈ {h, l}. We assume β(h, T ip, T−ip ) > β(l, T ip, T−ip ) for i ∈ {h, l}, that is all else
equal revolution is more likely in the high state.
Proposition 2 (1) If 1 − β(h, T , T ) ≥ (1+δ)(yr−T)
(1+δ)yr−T
then the equilibrium involves continued oli-
garchy, transfers are Tp = T in the first period and Tp = 0 in the second, there is a positive prob-
ability of revolution given by ρ(µh )β(h, T , T ) + ρ(µl )β(l, T , T ). With probability ρ(µl )β(l, T ip, T
−i
p )
revolution will be a mistake in the paretian sense that both rich and poor will be worse oﬀ ex-post.
With probability ρ(µh )
£
1− β(h, T , T )
¤
the poor will fail to rebel when it is in their interests to do
so. (2) If 1− β(h, T , T ) < (1+δ)(yr−T)
(1+δ)yr−T
the rich will introduce democracy and the equilibrium will
be identical to the full information case of proposition 1.
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The intuition behind the proposition isn’t too complicated, if the rich know the poor are unlikely
to rebel, that is if 1 − β(h, T , T ) is suﬃciently small, they are willing to run the risk of rebellion
because it allows them to avoid democracy with it’s implied second period transfers.
Notice that now both a peaceful transition to democracy and violent rebellion are possible
dependent on the informational structure and the probability of rebellion. However, these results
are obtained from the simplistic structure of a two period model in which the rich may choose only
between two levels of transfers, and where the beliefs and actions of the poor are represented by
revolution probabilities that are exogenous. In the sections that follow we generalize this analysis
in a number of ways: The number of periods becomes infinite, transfers become a continuous choice
variable, poor agents beliefs and actions are formally modeled, consequently revolution probabilities
are made endogenous, and revolutions may fail.
3 A More General Model with Endogenous Rebellions
In this general model we carry over all notation and assumptions from the two-period version unless
stated otherwise.
3.1 Economics
We continue to assume the government acts in the interests of the median enfranchised voter,
however it now has two policy instruments at its disposal, a common distortionary proportionate
tax on all incomes, τ , and a common per-person lump-sum transfer T . The distortionary eﬀects
of the income tax are given by the increasing convex cost function C(τ). The government is
again assumed to operate a per-period balanced budget, and hence redistributes all net tax revenue
back to the population via uniform lump-sum transfers. The government’s budget constraint in
per-person terms may then be written
T =
1
n
Ã nX
i=1
τyi − C(τ)ny
!
= (τ − C(τ)) y. (4)
where
y =
1
n
(myp + (n−m) yr) = (1− η) yp + ηyr (5)
represents average pre-tax income, and where η is the the proportion of the total population that
are rich.
There are now an infinite number of periods, in each infinitely lived agents of type i = r, p
receive income yi on which they pay taxes τyi and receive a transfer T . The single period indirect
utility of an individual agent is rewritten
F (yi | τ) = (1− τ)yi + (τ − C(τ)) y (6)
When appropriate we shall express the indirect utility derived from the discounted infinite stream
of income by the form
V (yi | τ) ≡ F (yi | τ)
1− δ . (7)
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3.2 Politics
We assume an initial state in which only the rich are enfranchised. In each period the poor have the
option of staging a rebellion or not. If a rebellion takes place, and is successful, the rich are ejected
from the country and the poor seize their endowment income in the current and all subsequent
periods. A rebellion is destructive and a portion µ of total endowment income is destroyed in
perpetuity. The magnitude of µ is stochastic, taking values of µh and µl with probabilities ρ(µj )
j = h, l respectively. As in the simple model the notation h and l denotes high and low threat
states, representing states in which there is either little or a great deal of destruction respectively,
hence again µl > µh . Note that we now assume destruction is total in the low state, that is µl = 1,
this does not qualitatively eﬀect any of our conclusions but helps considerably in simplifying the
exposition.
3.3 Information Structure
We assume that the enfranchised are fully informed about the structure of the economy and the
realization of the random variable µ. The rich, if present in the economy, are always fully informed.
The poor are perfectly informed about the structure of the economy, and also observe µ if enfran-
chised, but if unenfranchised they each receive an idiosyncratic signal si concerning the realization
of µ. The probability that the signal received by any poor agent is accurate is given by
ρ(µj | sj) > 1
2
j = h, l. (8)
The signal received by each poor agent is private information, unobservable to all other agents in
the economy both rich and poor.
3.3.1 The Beliefs of the Poor
The beliefs of each poor agent are the probabilities they attach to the two states conditional on
all information available to them. This information will include; their own signals, any inferences
they are able to make about the signals received by other poor agents, and any inferences they may
be able to make through observing the actions of the rich.
Condition 3 The beliefs of the poor are consistent in that (i) they are not inconsistent with the
known structure of the model, (ii) they are not inconsistent with the observed behavior of the rich
or of other poor agents.
This condition on the consistency of beliefs is essentially the assumption that expectations are
rational and helps greatly in reducing the number of potential equilibria by eliminating candidate
equilibria supported by "strange" oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs.
3.4 The Decisions of the Rich and Poor
3.4.1 The Rich
The rich initially control the government as they are the only agents enfranchised. If the rich do
not enfranchise the poor they set taxes and transfers; provided there is no subsequent revolution
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the players per-period payoﬀs are
F (yi | τr) = (1− τ r)yi + (τr − C(τr)) y i = r, p. (9)
However, the rich may choose to enfranchise the poor. In this case since the poor are the more
numerous, the median voter is one of their number, and their preferences determine taxes and
transfers.1
3.4.2 The Poor
If enfranchised the poor set taxes and hence transfers and the players per-period payoﬀs are
F (yi | τp) = (1− τp)yi + (τp − C(τp)) y i = r, p. (10)
If unenfranchised each poor agent may choose between accepting the tax/transfer pair oﬀered by the
rich or engage in a "revolutionary act", this act is costless, but only leads to a successful rebellion
in circumstances to be defined below. We define β(µj | τ) as the probability that a revolution will
be successful in state j = h, l given the tax rate τ . As we shall shortly see β(µj | τ) is decreasing in
the tax rate as this increases the number of poor agents that need to undertake a revolutionary act
before a revolution is successful. After a successful revolution the players per-period payoﬀs are
F (yr | 0) = 0, (11)
and
F (yp | 0) = y(1− µj) nm. (12)
We now state a useful lemma.
Lemma 4 ∂F (yr|τp,n)∂τp < 0, the per-period payoﬀs of the rich are monotonically decreasing in the
tax rate. ∂F (yp|τp,n)∂τp R 0 as τp Q τ
d
p the per-period payoﬀs of the poor have an interior maximum
defined by τdp.
3.5 Structure of the Game
This is a repeated stage game which is solved in the usual manner to obtain the Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium. Beginning in the initial state in which only the rich are enfranchised, in each period
the sequence of moves is as follows. Nature moves first and determines the state of the world µj
j = h, l. This is observed by the rich, the poor are not initially enfranchised and do not observe the
state.2 The rich then choose whether or not to extend the franchise to the poor. If the franchise
is extended the poor set taxes and transfers. The players receive their stage payoﬀs and the game
then continues with both rich and poor enfranchised in all subsequent periods. If the franchise is
1 If the rich choose to enfranchise any poor agents they will enfranchise all of them. Their motivation is precisely
to make a poor agent the median voter. This, as in Acemoglu, acts as a commitment device for the rich to a set of
taxes and transfers they would otherwise be unable to credibly promise.
2We introduce no notation to indicate which signal si is observed by which poor agent as this plays no role in our
subsequent analysis.
7
not extended then the rich set taxes, poor agents then receive idiosyncratic informative signals si on
the basis of which each poor agent chooses whether or not to engage in a "revolutionary act". The
revolutionary acts will with a given probability (that will be determined shortly) lead to a successful
revolution, in this case the players receive their stage payoﬀs and the game then continues without
the rich. If the revolution is unsuccessful the rich and poor receive their stage payoﬀs and then
the game repeats with nature again moving first. The following game tree is illustrative.
Nature
µh with probability ρh µl with probability ρl
Rich Rich
Democracy DemocracySet Taxes Set Taxes
PoorPoor
Poor Poor
Rebel RebelNo No
τd τd0 0
Game
Repeats
Game
Repeats
Permanent
Democracy
with rich
and poor
Permanent
Democracy
with no rich
Permanent
Democracy
with no rich
Permanent
Democracy
with rich
and poor
Set TaxesSet Taxes
τdτd
Figure 1: The Game in Extensive Form
One immediate observation is that if the equilibrium involves the rich choosing to set taxes at
the same rate for both realizations of the state of the world, then this reveals no information to the
poor. However, if the franchise is extended in one state but not the other, or, if diﬀerent tax rates
are set for the two states, then this is immediately revealing to the poor.
3.6 Potential Equilibria
3.6.1 Democracy
There are two potential democratic outcomes to the game, with and without the presence of the
rich, dependent on whether the rich peacefully instigate democracy, or, if democracy arises after a
revolution during which the rich are expelled. We term these inequitable and equitable democracies
respectively. If the rich are present in a democracy the poor set taxes so as to maximize
Max
τp
V (yp | τp) = F (yp | τp)
1− δ =
(1− τp)yp + (τp − C(τp)) y
1− δ . (13)
So let
τdp = Argmaxτp
V (yp | τp). (14)
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Then the players payoﬀs in this case will be
V (yi | τdp) =
(1− τdp)yi +
¡
τdp − C(τdp)
¢
y
1− δ i = r, p. (15)
We assume that the concession of democracy from the rich to poor is suﬃcient to prevent a revo-
lution. It is an open question why in a democracy the poor do not vote to expel the rich and seize
their endowments3.
If the rich are not present in a democracy, as occurs after a successful revolution, then the poor
do not tax themselves and the payoﬀs are
V (yp | 0, µj) = F (yp | 0, µ
j)
1− δ =
y(1− µj)n
(1− δ)m , (16)
V (yr | 0) = 0. (17)
3.6.2 Oligarchy
If the franchise is not extended to the poor, then a rich agent is the median voter and taxes maximize
their payoﬀs. Recall that given the state and the tax rate there is a probability of successful rebellion
given by β(µj | τ) which at this point we simply assert is non-increasing in τ , we shall establish
this formally in section 5 that follows. Further we shall also show that β(µh | τ) ≥ β(µl | τ) for
any given τ . With these two facts in hand we may state the logic of the oligarchy case.
As a first step to determining the taxes set by the rich we state the following.
Proposition 5 Taxes under oligarchy cannot be fully revealing of the state.
Recall that we require the beliefs of the poor to be consistent in the sense of condition 3.
Suppose first that a low tax were set in the low state and a high tax in the high state. Suppose
further that consistent with these taxes the poor believed with probability one that the state is
high if they observe the high tax rate and low when they observe the low one. We know from
lemma 4 that the payoﬀs of the rich are monotonically decreasing in the tax rate, hence the rich
would set the low tax in both states contradicting taxes being revealing. An immediate corollary
to proposition 5 is the following
Corollary 6 In a pure strategy equilibrium in which the beliefs of the poor are consistent the rich
cannot set state contingent tax rates.
3 It might well be that if there were a continuum of endowment levels rather than just rich and poor, then no type
would be willing to vote to expel types more afluent than themselves as this would lead to their being expelled next.
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Here the argument is immediate, were the rich to set state contingent taxes then these would be
revealing but proposition 4 rules this out in equilibrium. Hence in oligarchy the rich must choose
a single tax rate for both states. Qualitatively there are two tax rates that can be chosen, an
intermediate rate that admits a positive probability of rebellion in both states, and a high tax rate
that prevents rebellion in both states. The option of a very low tax rate is clearly never optimal
for the rich, further the rich would never choose a tax rate above that necessary to avoid rebellion
in the high state, so define as τ the tax rate that in a world of certainty would just avoid rebellion
in the low state and τ as the equivalent tax rate for the high state, hence these tax rates satisfy
(1− τ)yp + (τ − C(τ)) y
1− δ =
y(1− µh)n
(1− δ)m , (18)
and
(1− τ)yp + (τ − C(τ)) y
1− δ =
y(1− µl)n
(1− δ)m , (19)
then we know that τ ∈ [τ , τ ].
Secure Oligarchy A secure oligarchic equilibrium involves the rich choosing τ = τ for both
realization of µj , and beliefs by the poor such that the tax rate chosen is optimal. Suppose that
the beliefs of the poor are ρ(µj | τ ∈ [τ , τ)) = ρ(µj) j = h, l, that is the oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs of the
poor are their beliefs prior to observing the tax rate. Suppose further that V (yr | τ , µl, ρ(µl )) ≥
V (yr | τ , µl, ρ(µl )) ∀ τ ∈ [τ , τ), where we include ρ(µl ) in the payoﬀ function of the rich to indicate
the beliefs of the poor. This specifies an equilibrium in terms of strategies for the rich and beliefs
for the poor4. The intuition for this equilibrium is straightforward, the poor believe that whatever
tax rate they observe set by the rich that this conveys no information concerning the state of the
world. The rich cannot change the beliefs of the poor via manipulations of the tax rate, and the
solution to the rich’s optimization problem is the corner solution τ = τ .
Insecure Oligarchy In an insecure oligarchy the rich set a single tax rate which admits the
possibility of rebellion, but from which, given the beliefs of the poor, they will not wish to deviate
in either state. We already know that taxes cannot be state contingent. It follows that an
insecure oligarchic equilibrium involves a single tax rate τ ∈ [τ , τ), and consistent beliefs for the
poor such that that the chosen tax rate is optimal. Suppose the beliefs of the poor are as follows,
let τ∗ ∈ [τ , τ) be such that
ρ(µj | τ ∈ [τ , τ∗]) = ρ(µj ) j = h, l,
ρ(µh | τ ∈ (τ∗, τ ]) = 1. (20)
That is observations of a tax rate at or below some threshold τ∗ are considered uninformative,
whereas tax rates above the threshold are believed to be revealing of the high state. Now provided
V (yr | τ r, µh, ρ(µh )) ≥ V (yr | τ , µh, 1) the rich choose τr ∈ [τ , τ), that is they prefer a tax rate
that admits a positive probability of revolution to one that eliminates this threat. However for
4The payoﬀ function V (yr | τ, µl, ρ(µl )) should be read as the value of discounted expected indirect utility given
the agent recieves the income level of the rich yr, the single tax rate is τ , the current state is µl, and the beliefs of
the poor are given by their initial priors ρ(µl ).
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this to be an equilibrium also requires they select the same τr ∈ [τ , τ) in both states. To this end
suppose τ lr = Argmaxτr
V (yr | τr, µl, ρ(µl )) and τhr = Argmaxτr V (yr | τ r, µ
h, ρ(µh )) now provided
τhr > τ
l
r = τ
∗, which must be the case or beliefs would not be consistent, then τ r = τ∗, and
optimality requires V (yr | τ∗, µh, ρ(µh )) ≥ V (yr | τ , µh, 1). The intuition here is that the poor take
any tax rate above τ∗ as a signal that the state of the world is high with probability one, given
this if the rich choose a tax rate above τ∗ they must choose τ = τ or revolution is a certainty.
Alternatively if the rich set the tax rate at τ∗ for both states then no information is revealed and
the rich may avoid the tax cost of completely eliminating the risk of rebellion5.
Figures 2 a and b illustrate the conditions under which the equilibrium involves insecure and
oligarchy respectively
( | .)rV y
*τ ττ
( | , , ( ))l lr rV y τ µ ρ µ
( | , , ( ))h hr rV y τ µ ρ µ
(1 ) ( ( ))
1
ry C yτ τ τ
δ
− + −
−
τ
*( | , , ( ))l lrV y τ µ ρ µ
*( | , , ( ))h hrV y τ µ ρ µ
(1 ) ( ( ))
1
ry C yτ τ τ
δ
− + −
−
Figure 2a: Insecure Oligarchy
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− + −
−
τ
*( | , , ( ))l lrV y τ µ ρ µ
*( | , , ( ))h hrV y τ µ ρ µ
(1 ) ( ( ))
1
ry C yτ τ τ
δ
− + −
−
Figure 2b: Secure Oligarchy
A crucial element in whether or not the oligarchic equilibrium involves a positive probability
of rebellion is how sensitive the conditional probability of rebellion is to changes in the tax rate.
Hence it is necessary to provide the microfoundations underlying the decisions of the poor to engage
in rebellious acts. To accomplish this we draw on the literature on information cascades developed
by Banerjee (op. cit.), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (op. cit.) and previously applied as a
theory of political mass protest by Lohmann (op. cit.).
3.7 The Microfoundations of Rebellion
Rebellion is possible whenever in oligarchy the rich set a tax rate on the interval τr ∈ [τ , τ). In
these circumstances if a poor agent is "confident enough" that the state is high they will engage in
a rebellious act and the probability that a successful rebellion will ultimately arise is non-zero. To
model this idea we begin with a couple of relatively unrestrictive but useful simplifying assumptions.
First for a successful rebellion to take place we require all poor agents participate in the revolt.
Second we assume that in each period each poor agent chooses between two actions; they may
engage in a visible act of political protest, a = av, or may remain passively at home a = ao. These
5Note that if V (yr | τ∗, µl, ρ(µl)) > V (yr | τ, µh, 1) > V (yr | τ∗, µh, ρ(µh)) it might seem that no equlibrium
exists, but in this case the beliefs of the poor would not be consistent in the low state. Hence τ∗ must be chosen to
eliminate this possibility.
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actions are not directly costly. Third we assume that the poor make their decisions in a sequence
known to themselves alone.6
The poor agents are Bayesians. After observing the actions of the rich, and making any appro-
priate inferences, each receives a private signal si which is informative but imperfectly correlated
with the true state of the world µ. Sequentially they chose whether or not to engage in an act of
political protest or remain passive. The poor each observe the choices made by their counterparts
earlier in the sequence, and on the basis of these observations they update their beliefs in a Bayesian
fashion. The informational environment in which the poor are operating is therefore one where
information cascades occur.
Consider the poor agent i with beliefs about the state of the world characterized by the condi-
tional probability
ρi(µ
j | sj , A−i) (21)
where A−i is a vector of the actions chosen by all the poor agents prior to agent i. We know by
construction of the case that the poor agent i would prefer rebellion if they knew with certainty the
state to be high, whereas they would prefer to not rebel if they knew with certainty the state to be
low. Writing V (yp | τr) as the indirect utility of the poor if there is no revolution in the current
period7 then for any given τr ∈ (τ , τ) the following inequities hold
V (yp | 0, µh) > V (yp | τ r) > V (yp | 0, µl) (22)
an immediate implication of this is that for any agent i there is a critical probability ρ∗ such that
for all ρi(µ
h | sj , A−i) ≥ ρ∗ this agent prefers there be a rebellion and will choose the rebellious
act. ρ∗ is defined by
ρ∗V (yp | 0, µh) + (1− ρ∗)V (yp | 0, µl) = V (yp | τ r) (23)
or
ρ∗ =
V (yp | τ r)− V (yp | 0, µl)
V (yp | 0, µh)− V (yp | 0, µl) (24)
This "Political Protest Condition" is one of two key expressions How the beliefs of the poor agents
evolve and how they are eﬀected by the taxes set by the rich τr depends on the inferences they
make from observing the actions of each other.
3.7.1 The Evolution of Poor Agents Beliefs and Actions
We assume that the first poor agent will rebel if they receive the signal s1 = sh1 but not otherwise.
That is ρ1(µ
h | sh1 ) ≥ ρ∗ > ρ1(µh | sl1). Were this not the case a rebellion would only occur with
probability one or zero. Following the choice of the first poor agent the remainder update their
beliefs on the basis of the signal they receive and the inferences they make about their predecessors
signals given the actions they chose. All poor agents know that a rebellion requires unanimity,
6Loosely we might think that there are malcontents amongst the poor who act first, but their identity is kept
secret for purposes of personal safety.
7V (yp | τr) may be written as F (yp | τr)+ δ
?
ρ
?
µh
? ?
β
?
µh | τr
?
V (yp | 0, µh) +
?
1− β
?
µh | τr
??
V (yp | τr, µh)
?
+ρ
?
µl
? ?
β
?
µl | τr
?
V (yp | 0, µl) +
?
1− β
?
µl | τr
??
V (yp | τr , µl)
??
which by solving the geometric series reduces
to?
F (yp|τr)+δρ
?
µh
?
β
?
µh|τr
?
V (yp|0,µh)+ρ
?
µl
?
β
?
µl|τr
?
V (yp|0,µl)
1−δ[ρ(µh)(1−β(µh|τr))+ρ(µl)(1−β(µl|τr))]
?
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hence we assume that once one agent chooses ak = aok then the remaining m − k will do likewise.
Using Bayes rule the beliefs of the ith poor agent having observed all preceding agents choose
ak = avk may be written
ρi(µ
h | sh ∩A−i) = ρi(s
h ∩A−i | µh)ρ(µh)
ρi(sh ∩A−i | µh)ρ(µh) + ρi(sh ∩A−i | µl)ρ(µl)
(25)
where ρi(s
h ∩A−i | µh) = ρ(sh | µh)i and ρi(sh ∩A−i | µl) = ρ(sh | µl)i so the beliefs of agent i on
receipt of the signal sh may be rewritten
ρi(µ
h | sh ∩A−i) = ρ(s
h | µh)iρ(µh)
ρ(sh | µh)iρ(µh) + ρ(sh | µl)iρ(µl) (26)
Lemma 7 If the first poor agent on receiving the signal sh1 chooses a1 = av1 then each successive
poor agent that receives the signal shk also chooses ak = a
v
k.
3.7.2 Information Cascades
Each poor agent chooses the action a = av if they are suﬃciently confident that the state of the
world is µh. Once a large enough number of poor agents have chosen an act of political protest
then the priors that subsequent poor agents derive from observing these actions "swamp" their own
signals, that is
Proposition 8 ∃ an i such that if all i < i chose a = av then all i ≥ i will choose a = av
irrespective of their idiosyncratic signals. Furthermore i = int
⎛
⎝ ln
??
1−ρ∗
ρ∗
??
ρ(µh)
ρ(µl)
??
ρ(sl|µh)
ρ(sl|µl)
??
ln
?
ρ(sh|µl)
ρ(sh|µh)
?
⎞
⎠+ 1
(where int indicates the integer part of the term), and is hence non-decreasing in ρ∗.
Proposition 8 tells us that if the first i − 1 poor agents receive the signal sh and choose the
action av then all subsequent agents will neglect their own signals and behave similarly. There is
an information cascade. Writing this condition in slightly diﬀerent form we get (see the proof of
proposition 8) the "Cascade Condition"
ρ∗ =
³
ρ(µh)
ρ(µl)
ρ(sl|µh)
ρ(sl|µl)
´
³
ρ(µh)
ρ(µl)
ρ(sl|µh)
ρ(sl|µl)
´
+
³
ρ(sh|µl)
ρ(sh|µh)
´i−1 (27)
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3.7.3 The Probability of Revolution
Given that it requires the first i − 1 poor agents receive the signal sh for an information cascade
and hence revolution to occur then the conditional probabilities of rebellion are
β(µh | τ r) = ρ(sh | µh)i−1 (28)
β(µl | τ r) = ρ(sh | µl)i−1 (29)
and the unconditional probability is
β(τ∗r) ≡ ρ(sh | µh)i−1ρ(µh) + ρ(sh | µl)i−1ρ(µl) (30)
If the rich set the state invariant tax rate τ r then the critical probability becomes ρ∗ =
V (yp|τr)−V (yp|0,µl)
V (yp|0,µh)−V (yp|0,µl) which is increasing in τr for all τ r ∈ [0, τ
d
p]. Since i is non-decreasing in
ρ∗ and the β0s are decreasing in i it follows that the probability of a successful rebellion is non-
increasing in the tax rate set by the rich. Hence in setting the tax rate, τr, the rich face a trade-oﬀ
between paying lower taxes themselves and a higher probability that a rebellion will succeed. We
may now explore the circumstances under which a rebellion is more likely’
Proposition 9 In any stable oligarchic equilibrium a revolution is more likely to occur if (i) the
destruction due to revolution is less, that is the smaller is µh, (ii) the less eﬃcient is the tax system,
that is the larger is C(τr), (iii) the relatively more impoverished are the poor , that is the smaller
is yp/y,
Again these conclusions are largely intuitive. The first part of the proposition states that the
poor are more likely to rebel when the destruction due to rebellion is lower. The mechanism here
operates as follows: If the destruction due to rebellion is less then the critical probability that
induces each poor agent to choose an act of political protest is lower and hence the fewer are the
"high" signals required to reach the point where an agents priors will cause their beliefs to exceed
this value irrespective of their own signal, the cascade starts after fewer "high" signals. Part (ii)
arises because if the tax system is less eﬃcient then for any tax the net transfers from rich to poor
are smaller, this raises the relative value to the poor of rebellion, lowering the critical probability ρ∗
this makes a rebellion more likely as it is exceeded by agents priors after fewer "high" signals. Part
(iii) simply states that if the poor are relatively less prosperous, then as the poor seize the larger
endowments of the rich after a successful rebellion it takes less in terms of a probability attached to
the state being high for the poor to choose an act of political protest. Figures 3a and 3b illustrate
these comparative statics results.
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Figure 3a: High State is Unlikely
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Figure 3b: High State is Likely
We see that each of the claims made in proposition 9 can be represented in figure 3 by a rightward
shift in the political protest condition leading to an increase in the equilibrium level of i which we
know from (28)-(30) leads to an increase in the probability of rebellion in both states of the world.
3.8 Equilibria
Despite its complexity there are only three possible pure strategy equilibrium outcomes for this
game; inequitable democracy, secure oligarchy, or insecure oligarchy. Formally we may state
Proposition 10 ∃ admissible parameter values such that each of the three equilibria may arise.
This is perhaps unsurprising, if we consider some of the extreme cases the intuition becomes
clear. Suppose for example that the probability of the high state occurring were close to zero,
then the rich would have little incentive to instigate democracy, nor would they set high taxes
as the likelihood of a rebellion is approximately zero. Insecure oligarchy would characterize the
equilibrium. Alternatively, suppose the probability of a high state is close to one and the quality
of the signal received by the poor is high, a revolution is very likely unless the rich set high taxes
either directly in a secure oligarchy or indirectly by conceding democracy.
3.8.1 Secure Oligarchy, Insecure Oligarchy or Democracy
We are now in a position to characterize the initial conditions of an economy in terms of the deep
parameters of our model that lead to the three possible equilibrium types. These deep parameters
include: The eﬃciency of the tax system, C(τ r), the quality of poor agents information, ρ(sj | µk)
j = h, l, k = h, j (which may be thought of as representing the openness of the society), the
destruction arising from a rebellion, µj j = h, l, (which might be thought of as representing the
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repressiveness of the society), the society’s demographics in the sense that the oligarchs may consist
of a few super-rich or a large number of moderately aﬄuent individuals. The conclusions of this
section may be verified by inspecting the proof of proposition 10. The possibilities are illustrated in
figures 4a and 4b. In 4a we illustrate circumstances where the rich will select either secure oligarchy
or democracy dependent on which involves the lower tax rate. In 4b small tax concessions in an
insecure oligarchy are suﬃcient to greatly reduce the likelihood of rebellion making this the rich’s
desired option.
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Figure 4a: Secure Oligarchy or Democracy
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Figure 4b: Insecure Oligarchy
Information Quality. The quality of information received by the poor is characterized by the
signals ρ(sj | µk) j = h, l, k = h, l, as ρ(sj | µk) → 1 for j = k the poor are increasingly well
informed about the state of the world. In very closed, secretive, societies where ρ(sj | µk) → 12
∀j = h, l, k = h, l j = k the threat of rebellion is low as it takes many agents to receive the signal
sh for an information cascade to be triggered. Here the rich tend to choose insecure oligarchy
they optimally set low taxes, which yield only small net transfers from themselves to the poor and
accept the small risk of rebellion.
The Destructiveness of a Revolution. While we have treated µj j = h, l as exogenous states
of the world, it makes sense to think of them as being determined in part by the characteristics
of the society and in part by prior investments by the rich. For example if a society is in some
sense tribal then well organized social groups may conflict over resources raising the potential for
destruction. Also, if the rich have made significant prior investments in the police, security services
or the military then again the damage from revolution will be substantial. In both these cases
the model predicts that oligarchy will persist in either the insecure variety with low probabilities of
rebellion, or the secure variety where the tax needed to deter rebellion is quite low. Alternatively
if the destruction due to a revolution is negligible then we would anticipate the rich conceding
democracy.
The Eﬃciency of the Tax System. If the tax system is highly eﬃcient, that is C(τr) is low for
any τr then it is relatively inexpensive for the rich to persuade the poor not to rebel and the model
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predicts oligarchy in one of its two forms. Alternatively if the tax system is highly ineﬃcient,
perhaps due to tax evasion and the like, then the rich may have little option but to instigate
democracy.
The Demographics of the Rich. For any given level of endowment income per rich agent, a
larger the numbers of rich has two eﬀects on the potential regime. First if there are more rich
a lower tax rate is associated with any level of redistribution from rich to poor, making the per
rich agent costs lower both because of the lower taxes, and because the losses due to the distortion
the C(τr)0s are lower. However, for a given population more rich means fewer poor which the
consequence that the returns per poor agent to revolution are greater.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have examined the economic forces behind political regime determination in a
world where information is asymmetric, this is accomplished by combing Acemoglu’s model of the
economics of political regime determination with Lohmann’s model of political mass protest. By
doing this we are able to provide some microfoundations for the threat of rebellion central to the
explanation of political regime determination. The resulting structure allows us to explain many
complexities that were heretofore outside the scope of the literatures on which we draw. Most
particularly we are able to explain circumstances where democracy arrives both after a peaceful
transition in the sense of Acemoglu and after a revolution. We are also able to explain when
an oligarchic regime is stable and when it is inevitably replaced by democracy. Furthermore,
democracy or its absence can constitute errors in an ex-post paretian sense; the poor may rebel
in circumstances were the destruction due to revolution makes this unwise, and may fail to do so
when the circumstances are ripe.
Which particular equilibrium of the model arrises can be related to the deep structural features
of society. Our main contribution is perhaps to model the information transmission process that
leads to a possible rebellion and then use this to gain new insights into the determination of
political regimes. In our analysis whether a society is characterized by an openness of information
is represented by the quality of the signals received by the poor. In open societies of this nature our
model predicts that it is diﬃcult for the rich to sustain an oligarchy, and democracy tends to arise.
By modelling the process by which rebellions arise we also get insights into how other structural
features of an economy translate into particular political regimes. For example highly factionalized
societies might be anticipated to experience severe damage from rebellion, this makes it relatively
inexpensive for the rich to continue with oligarchy.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
1. Tp = 0 in the second period as (1 + δ) yr −
³
m
n−m
´
T > (1 + δ)
h
yr −
³
m
n−m
´
T
i
and there is
no threat of revolution in the second period. Tp = T in the first period since (1 + δ) yp + T >
(1 + δ)
¡
yp +
¡n−m
m
¢
yr
¢
(1− µl ). as the rich must oﬀer Tp = T to prevent a revolution. The rich
do not extend the franchise because (1 + δ) yr −
³
m
n−m
´
T > (1 + δ)
h
yr −
³
m
n−m
´
T
i
.
2. Note first that as in the first part Tp = 0 in the second period as (1 + δ) yr −
³
m
n−m
´
T >
(1 + δ)
h
yr −
³
m
n−m
´
T
i
and there is no threat of revolution. Now,
(1 + δ)
¡
yp + T
¢
> (1 + δ)
¡
yp +
¡n−m
m
¢
yr
¢
(1− µh ) > (1 + δ) yp + T which implies the poor rebel
unless oﬀered Tp = T in both periods. Since (1 + δ)
h
yr −
³
m
n−m
´
T
i
> 0 the rich wish to oﬀer
Tp = T in both periods and so must extend the franchise.
Proof of Proposition 2. First we eliminate several options as equilibrium strategies for the
rich. We note that the rich cannot choose positive transfers in one state and none in the other.
Suppose the rich chose {Th, 0l},then on observing Tp = T the poor know the state is high and since
(1 + δ)
¡
yp +
¡n−m
m
¢
yr
¢
(1− µh ) > (1 + δ) yp+T , they rebel with probability 1 that is β(h, T , 0) = 0.
On observing Tp = 0 the poor know the state is low. but since (1 + δ)
¡
yp +
¡n−m
m
¢
yr
¢
(1− µl ) >
(1 + δ) yp they again choose rebellion that is β(l, T , 0) = 0. Hence this cannot be an equilibrium strat-
egy for the rich. Now suppose the rich chose {0h, T l}. Now the poor will not rebel in the low state
since (1 + δ) yp+T > (1 + δ)
¡
yp +
¡n−m
m
¢
yr
¢
(1− µl ), however since (1 + δ)
¡
yp +
¡n−m
m
¢
yr
¢
(1− µh ) >
(1 + δ) yp + T the poor would rebel in the high state. But observations on Tp would be revealing,
hence the rich would set Tp = T in both states avoiding rebellion, but this contradicts the idea that
transfers are revealing, thus {0h, T l} also cannot be an equilibrium strategy for the rich. This
leaves two possibilities under oligarchy {0h, 0l} and {Th, T l}. We may immediately exclude {0h, 0l}
the payoﬀ structure immediately implies β(l, 0, 0) = β(h, 0, 0) = 0, rebellion is certain in both
states. Hence there are only two options remaining oligarchy with {Th, T l} or franchise exten-
sion. Writing the expected payoﬀs for the rich in the two cases we get that franchise extension will
not be chosen if β(h, T , T )
£
(1 + δ) yr − T
¤
≥ (1 + δ)
¡
yr − T
¢
manipulating this expression gives
β(h, T , T ) ≥ (1+δ)(yr−T)
(1+δ)yr−T
as required. The rest of the proof is definitional.
Proof of Lemma 4. (a) ∂F (yr|τp)∂τp < 0 as τp Q τ
d
p. We have F (yr | τp) = (1 − τp)yr +
(τp − C(τp)) y, so diﬀerentiating with respect to τp we get ∂F (yr|τp)∂τp = (1− C
0(τp)) y − yr now
C 0(τp) > 0 and y < yr and the result follows as required. (b)
∂F (yp|τp,n)
∂τp R 0 as τp Q τ
d
p now
diﬀerentiating F (yp | τp) = (1− τp)yp + (τp − C(τp)) y gives ∂F (yr|τp)∂τp = (1− C0(τp)) y− yp again
C 0(τp) > 0 but now y > yp and the result again follows as required.
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose contrary to the proposition that taxes were fully revealing of the
state, then the rich set taxes that satisfy the no-revolution conditions (1− τ jr)yp+
¡
τ jr − C(τ jr)
¢
y =
18
y(1− µj)
¡ n
m
¢
j = h, l, but since µh 6= µl then τhr 6= τ lr, and by lemma 4 the rich set the lower tax
rate for all µj contradicting taxes being revealing.
Proof of Corollary 6. Follows immediately from proposition 5.
Proof of Lemma 7. This follows immediately from noting that
ρi(µ
h | sh ∩ A−i) = ρ(sh|µh)iρ(µh)ρ(sh|µh)iρ(µh)+ρ(sh|µl)iρ(µl) is monotonically increasing in i hence if ρ1(µh |
sh ∩A−1) > ρ∗ so too must ρi(µh | sh ∩A−i) > ρ∗ ∀i > 1.
Proof of Proposition 8. We wish to show ∃ an i such that if all i < i chose a = av then all
i ≥ i will choose a = av irrespective of their idiosyncratic signals. First note that we may write
1
ρi(µh|sh∩A−i) = 1+
ρ(sh|µl)iρ(µl)
ρ(sh|µh)iρ(µh) . Now using L’Hopital’s rule we may state limi→∞
³
1
ρi(µh|sh∩A−i)
´
→
1 which implies lim
i→∞
ρi(µ
h | sh ∩ A−i) → 1 and by Lemma 7 we know ρi(µh | sh ∩ A−i) is
monotonically increasing in i. It now follows that for any ρ∗ ∈ [0, 1) we can find an i such
that ρi−1(µ
h | sh∩A−(i−1)) > ρ∗ now by Bayes rule if the ith individual receives the signal sl their
posterior beliefs are ρi(µ
h | sl ∩ A−i) = ρ(s
l|µh)ρi−1(µh|sh∩A−i−1)
ρ(sl|µh)ρi−1(µh|sh∩A−(i−1))+ρ(sl|µl)ρi−1(µl|sh∩A−(i−1))
but as
lim
i→∞
ρi(µ
h | sh ∩ A−(i−1)) → 1 then lim
i→∞
ρi(µ
l | sh ∩ A−(i−1)) → 0 and hence from the posterior
beliefs we have lim
i→∞
ρi(µ
h | sl ∩A−i)→ 1 so that we can find an i as required. Now to identify the
value of i we first allow it to take non-integer values and solve ρ∗ = ρi(µ
h | sl ∩A−i) using
ρ∗ = ρi(µ
h | sl ∩A−i) = ρ(s
l | µh)ρi−1(µh | sh ∩A−(i−1))
ρ(sl | µh)ρi−1(µh | sh ∩A−(i−1)) + ρ(sl | µl)ρi−1(µl | sh ∩A−(i−1))
=
ρ(sl | µh)
h
ρ(sh|µh)i−1ρ(µh)
ρ(sh|µh)i−1ρ(µh)+ρ(sh|µl)i−1ρ(µl)
i
ρ(sl | µh)
h
ρ(sh|µh)i−1ρ(µh)
ρ(sh|µh)i−1ρ(µh)+ρ(sh|µl)i−1ρ(µl)
i
+ ρ(sl | µl)
h
1− ρ(sh|µh)i−1ρ(µh)ρ(sh|µh)i−1ρ(µh)+ρ(sh|µl)i−1ρ(µl)
i
=
ρ(sl | µh)ρ(sh | µh)i−1ρ(µh)
ρ(sl | µh)ρ(sh | µh)i−1ρ(µh) + ρ(sl | µl)ρ(sh | µl)i−1ρ(µl)
and rearranging we get µ
1− ρ∗
ρ∗
¶µ
ρ(µh)
ρ(µl)
ρ(sl | µh)
ρ(sl | µl)
¶
=
µ
ρ(sh | µl)
ρ(sh | µh)
¶i−1
taking logs and rearranging gives
i = 1 +
ln
h³
1−ρ∗
ρ∗
´³
ρ(µh)
ρ(µl)
´³
ρ(sl|µh)
ρ(sl|µl)
´i
ln
h
ρ(sh|µl)
ρ(sh|µh)
i
i is then the integer part and is as in the text .
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Proof of Proposition 9. The proof of proposition 9 involves demonstrating that figures 3a and
3b are an accurate representation of the equilibrium determination of ρ∗ and i. We need to derive
the properties of the "political protest" and "cascade conditions".
ρ∗ =
F (yp|τr)
V (yp|0,µh) + δρ
¡
µh
¢
ρ(sh | µh)i−1
1− δ
h
ρ (µh)
³
1− ρ(sh | µh)i−1
´
+ ρ (µl)
³
1− ρ(sh | µl)i−1
´i
and
ρ∗ =
³
ρ(µh)
ρ(µl)
ρ(sl|µh)
ρ(sl|µl)
´
³
ρ(µh)
ρ(µl)
ρ(sl|µh)
ρ(sl|µl)
´
+
³
ρ(sh|µl)
ρ(sh|µh)
´i−1
Taking limits of these expressions as i→ 1 and i→∞ we get
lim
i→1
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
F (yp|τr)
V (yp|0,µh) + δρ
¡
µh
¢
ρ(sh | µh)i−1
1− δ
X
k=h,l
ρ (µk)
³
1− ρ(sh | µk)i−1
´
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ →
F (yp | τr)
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¢
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ρ(µl)
ρ(sl|µh)
ρ(sl|µl)
1 + ρ(µ
h)
ρ(µl)
ρ(sl|µh)
ρ(sl|µl)
lim
i→∞
⎛
⎜⎝
³
ρ(µh)
ρ(µl)
ρ(sl|µh)
ρ(sl|µl)
´
³
ρ(µh)
ρ(µl)
ρ(sl|µh)
ρ(sl|µl)
´
+
³
ρ(sh|µl)
ρ(sh|µh)
´i−1
⎞
⎟⎠→ 1
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Next diﬀerentiating the two expressions with respect to ρ∗ and i we get
dρ∗
di
¯¯¯¯
protest
=
δρ
¡
µh
¢
ρ(sh | µh)i−1 ln ρ(sh | µh)
⎡
⎣1− δ
X
k=h,l
ρ
¡
µk
¢ ³
1− ρ(sh | µk)i−1
´⎤
⎦
⎡
⎣1− δ
X
k=h,l
ρ (µk)
³
1− ρ(sh | µk)i−1
´⎤
⎦
2
+
δ
X
k=h,l
ρ
¡
µk
¢ ³
1− ρ(sh | µk)i−1
´
ln ρ(sh | µk)
h
F (yp|τr)
V (yp|0,µh) + δρ
¡
µh
¢
ρ(sh | µh)i−1
i
⎡
⎣1− δ
X
k=h,l
ρ (µk)
³
1− ρ(sh | µk)i−1
´⎤
⎦
2
=
(1− ρ∗) δρ
¡
µh
¢
ρ(sh | µh)i−1 ln ρ(sh | µh)− ρ∗δρ ¡µl¢ ρ(sh | µl)i−1 ln ρ(sh | µl)
1− δ
X
k=h,l
ρ (µk)
³
1− ρ(sh | µk)i−1
´ R 0
and
dρ∗
di
¯¯¯¯
cascade
= −
³
ρ(sh|µl)
ρ(sh|µh)
´i−1
ln
³
ρ(sh|µl)
ρ(sh|µh)
´³
ρ(µh)
ρ(µl)
ρ(sl|µh)
ρ(sl|µl)
´
∙³
ρ(sh|µl)
ρ(sh|µh)
´i−1
+
³
ρ(µh)
ρ(µl)
ρ(sl|µh)
ρ(sl|µl)
´¸2 > 0
Now as i→ 1 and i→∞ we get
lim
i→1
Ã
dρ∗
di
¯¯¯¯
protest
!
→ (1− ρ∗) δρ
¡
µh
¢
ln ρ(sh | µh)− ρ∗δρ ¡µl¢ ln ρ(sh | µl)
lim
i→∞
Ã
dρ∗
di
¯¯¯¯
protest
!
→ 0
and
lim
i→1
µ
dρ∗
di
¯¯¯¯
cascade
¶
→ −
ln
³
ρ(sh|µl)
ρ(sh|µh)
´³
ρ(µh)
ρ(µl)
ρ(sl|µh)
ρ(sl|µl)
´
h
1 +
³
ρ(µh)
ρ(µl)
ρ(sl|µh)
ρ(sl|µl)
´i2 > 0
lim
i→∞
µ
dρ∗
di
¯¯¯¯
cascade
¶
→ 0
Further note that the cascade condition is invariant with respect to F (yp | τr), V (yp | 0, µh) and δ
whereas the protest condition has the properties
dρ∗
dF (yp | τr)
¯¯¯¯
i
=
1
V (yp|0,µh)
1− δ
h
ρ (µh)
³
1− ρ(sh | µh)i−1
´
+ ρ (µl)
³
1− ρ(sh | µl)i−1
´i > 0
dρ∗
dV (yp | 0, µh)
¯¯¯¯
i
=
− F (yp|τr)
[V (yp|0,µh)]2
1− δ
h
ρ (µh)
³
1− ρ(sh | µh)i−1
´
+ ρ (µl)
³
1− ρ(sh | µl)i−1
´i < 0
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which immediately leads to the conclusions reported in proposition 9 when dρ
∗
di
¯¯¯
protest
< 0 and
also gives these results when dρ
∗
di
¯¯¯
protest
> dρ
∗
di
¯¯¯
cascade
> 0 which are easily seen to be necessary
conditions for stability of the equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 10. To demonstrate this proposition we need to show there exist parameter
values such that V (yr | τdp) > Max
©
V (yr | τ∗, µh, ρ(µh )), V (yr | τ , µh, 1)
ª
, V (yr | τ∗, µh, ρ(µh )) >
Max
©
V (yr | τdp), V (yr | τ , µh, 1)
ª
, and V (yr | τ , µh, 1) > Max
©
V (yr | τdp), V (yr | τ∗, µh, ρ(µh ))
ª
can each hold. Note first that τdp ≥ τ > τ∗ ⇒ F (yr | τ∗) > F (yr | τ) ≥ F (yr | τdp)
1. Conditions for the case V (yr | τ∗, µh, ρ(µh )) > Max
©
V (yr | τdp), V (yr | τ , µh, 1)
ª
.
Note first that V (yr | τ , µh, 1) > V (yr | τdp) since the latter involves maximal transfers from rich
to poor. Hence the case can be established if V (yr | τ∗, µh, ρ(µh ) > V (yr | τ , µh, 1). We have
V (yr | τ , µh, 1) = F (yr|τ)1−δ and τ satisfies (1−τ)yp+(τ−C(τ))y1−δ = y(1−µ
h)n
(1−δ)m . Now
V (yr | τ∗, µh, ρ(µh ))
=
³
1− ρ(sh | µh)i−1
´ £
F (yr | τ∗) + δ
£
ρ
¡
µh
¢
V (yr | τ∗, µh, ρ(µh )) + ρ
¡
µl
¢
V (yr | τ∗, µl, ρ(µh ))
¤¤
=
³
1− ρ(sh | µh)i−1
´ £
F (yr | τ∗) + δ
£
ρ
¡
µl
¢
V (yr | τ∗, µl, ρ(µh ))
¤¤
1−
³
1− ρ(sh | µh)i−1
´
δρ (µh)
and similarly
V (yr | τ∗, µl, ρ(µh )) =
³
1− ρ(sh | µl)i−1
´ £
F (yr | τ∗) + δ
£
ρ
¡
µh
¢
V (yr | τ∗, µh, ρ(µh ))
¤¤
1−
³
1− ρ(sh | µl)i−1
´
δρ (µl)
=
³
1− ρ(sh | µh)i−1
´∙
F (yr | τ∗) + δ
∙
ρ
¡
µl
¢ ?1−ρ(sh|µl)i−1?[F (yr|τ∗)+δ[ρ(µh)V (yr|τ∗,µh,ρ(µh ))]]
1−(1−ρ(sh|µl)i−1)δρ(µl)
¸¸
1−
³
1− ρ(sh | µh)i−1
´
δρ (µh)
substituting in and rearranging gives
V (yr | τ∗, µh, ρ(µh ))
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
³
1− ρ(sh | µh)i−1
´ ∙
1 + δ
∙
ρ
¡
µl
¢ ?1−ρ(sh|µl)i−1?
1−(1−ρ(sh|µl)i−1)δρ(µl)
¸¸
1−
³
1− ρ(sh | µh)i−1
´
δρ (µh)−
³
1− ρ(sh | µh)i−1
´
δ
∙
ρ (µl) (
1−ρ(sh|µl)i−1)δρ(µh)
1−(1−ρ(sh|µl)i−1)δρ(µl)
¸
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠F (yr | τ
∗)
Hence since F (yr | τ∗) > F (yr | τ) the condition holds if
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
³
1− ρ(sh | µh)i−1
´∙
1 + δ
∙
ρ
¡
µl
¢ ?1−ρ(sh|µl)i−1?
1−(1−ρ(sh|µl)i−1)δρ(µl)
¸¸
1−
³
1− ρ(sh | µh)i−1
´
δρ (µh)−
³
1− ρ(sh | µh)i−1
´
δ
∙
ρ (µl) (
1−ρ(sh|µl)i−1)δρ(µh)
1−(1−ρ(sh|µl)i−1)δρ(µl)
¸
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠→
1
1− δ
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which is clearly satisfied if i→∞. To show this is possible take the"political protest" and "cascade
conditions".
ρ∗ =
F (yp|τr)
V (yp|0,µh) + δρ
¡
µh
¢
ρ(sh | µh)i−1
1− δ
h
ρ (µh)
³
1− ρ(sh | µh)i−1
´
+ ρ (µl)
³
1− ρ(sh | µl)i−1
´i
and
ρ∗ =
³
ρ(µh)
ρ(µl)
ρ(sl|µh)
ρ(sl|µl)
´
³
ρ(µh)
ρ(µl)
ρ(sl|µh)
ρ(sl|µl)
´
+
³
ρ(sh|µl)
ρ(sh|µh)
´i−1
equate them to give³
ρ(µh)
ρ(µl)
ρ(sl|µh)
ρ(sl|µl)
´
³
ρ(µh)
ρ(µl)
ρ(sl|µh)
ρ(sl|µl)
´
+
³
ρ(sh|µl)
ρ(sh|µh)
´i−1 =
F (yp|τr)
V (yp|0,µh) + δρ
¡
µh
¢
ρ(sh | µh)i−1
1− δ
h
ρ (µh)
³
1− ρ(sh | µh)i−1
´
+ ρ (µl)
³
1− ρ(sh | µl)i−1
´i
Now let F (yp|τr)1−δ = V (yp | 0, µh) and it can be verifies that the solution to the condition is i =∞.
2. Conditions for the caseV (yr | τ , µh, 1) > Max
©
V (yr | τdp), V (yr | τ∗, µh, ρ(µh ))
ª
We have
V (yr | τ∗, µh, ρ(µh ))
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
³
1− ρ(sh | µh)i−1
´ ∙
1 + δ
∙
ρ
¡
µl
¢ ?1−ρ(sh|µl)i−1?
1−(1−ρ(sh|µl)i−1)δρ(µl)
¸¸
1−
³
1− ρ(sh | µh)i−1
´
δρ (µh)−
³
1− ρ(sh | µh)i−1
´
δ
∙
ρ (µl) (
1−ρ(sh|µl)i−1)δρ(µh)
1−(1−ρ(sh|µl)i−1)δρ(µl)
¸
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠F (yr | τ
∗)
Clearly if ρ(sh | µh) → 1 ⇒ V (yr | τ∗, µh, ρ(µh )) → 0, now V (yr | τ , µh, 1) ≥ V (yr | τdp) since
τdp involve the maximal transfer from rich to poor. Hence if V (yr | τ , µh, 1) > 0 the result follows.
We have V (yr | τ , µh, 1) = F (yr|τ)1−δ and τ satisfies F (yp|τ)1−δ = (1−τ)yp+(τ−C(τ))y1−δ = y(1−µ
h)n
(1−δ)m > 0.
Now yr > yp ⇒ (1−τ)yr+(τ−C(τ))y1−δ >
(1−τ)yp+(τ−C(τ))y
1−δ and the result follows.
3. Conditions for the case V (yr | τdp) > Max
©
V (yr | τ∗, µh, ρ(µh )), V (yr | τ , µh, 1)
ª
Again let ρ(sh | µh)→ 1⇒ V (yr | τ∗, µh, ρ(µh ))→ 0.ρ(sh | µh)→ 1⇒ V (yr | τ∗, µh, ρ(µh ))→
0 Now note that V (yr | τdp) =
(1−τdp)yr+(τ
d
p−C(τ
d
p))y
1−δ and that V (yp | τdp) =
(1−τdp)yp+(τ
d
p−C(τ
d
p))y
1−δ
now in democracy the poor set taxes to maximize V (yp | τdp) and note that evaluated at τ = 0 we
have V (yp | 0) = yp1−δ > 0 hence V (yp | τdp) > V (yp | 0) > 0, now yr > yp ⇒
(1−τdp)yr+(τdp−C(τdp))y
1−δ >
(1−τdp)yp+(τdp−C(τdp))y
1−δ so V (yp | τdp) > V (yr | τ∗, µh, ρ(µh )). Finally suppose (1−τ)yp+(τ−C(τ))y1−δ <
y(1−µh)n
(1−δ)m then τ cannot prevent rebellion and democracy must occur.
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